Introduction
Prior to the Asian crisis of 1997/98, benign world liquidity conditions contributed to credit expansion and overinvestment 2 in the East Asian economies until they were hit by a deep recession that revealed unsustainable investment projects (Saxena and Wong 2002) . Similarly to the tiger economies in the 90s, the Central and Eastern European (CEE 3 A substantial number of papers focus on identifying how sudden liquidity shocks affect inflation and growth in small open economies. Therefore, several variations of Sims (1980) 's VAR methodology are applied throughout the literature (e.g. Mojon and Peersman 2003 , Canova 2005 and Schneider and Fenz 2008 . For CEE, for instance Arnostova and Hurnik (2004) find that changes in EMU liquidity conditions affect inflation in the Czech Republic.
And Kuijs (2002) finds a quick response towards EMU liquidity shocks on prices in Slovakia.
Although previous research shows that liquidity shocks affect inflation and growth in CEE, it does not come up with an explanation of how benign liquidity conditions can build up a crisis potential during the boom period. To explain the emergence of a crisis, most current research assumes that an exogenous shock changes aggregate supply, demand or liquidity conditions. Then, the rational and fully informed agents adjust to the new situation. The assumption of price stickiness allows for an adjustment period that is interpreted as a business cycle (De Grauwe 2008, Lombari and Sgherri 2007) .
In contrast, Hayek (1929) and Mises (1912) argue that exuberated credit growth causes an overinvestment boom that endogenously leads to a bust (in a closed economy). The reasons for buoyant credit growth are irrational behavior and benign liquidity conditions of the banking sector. 4 Robbins (1934) most prominently applies their theory to explain the causes of the Great Depression. Furthermore, Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) use quantitative tools to find evidence of whether a credit boom contributed to the Great Depression, approving the main arguments of the Mises-Hayek theory.
For (small) open economies, White (2006) argues that the credit boom explanation of the business cycle may even be more applicable, as capital in-and outflows can bring about booms driven by foreign credit. Also, McKinnon and Pill (1997) explain that buoyant foreign borrowing may cause overinvestment in small open economies. In this sense, Krugman (1998) and Corsetti et al. (1999) find overinvestment and over-borrowing (due to moral hazard of banks) to be causes of the East Asian crisis. And more recently, Schnabl and Hoffmann (2008) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2009a) argue that easy liquidity conditions after 2001 contributed to investment booms around the world, especially in small open economies.
As the aim of this paper is to analyze whether easy (EMU) liquidity conditions triggered a credit-induced boom-and-bust cycle in CEE, it is necessary to understand how overinvestment can emerge due to benign credit conditions. Therefore, the paper starts with an introduction of the overinvestment theory of Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) (section 2).
Then, augmenting the overinvestment theory to a small open economy framework shall help with understanding possible causes of buoyant credit growth and overinvestment in the small open economies of CEE. Section 4 provides an analysis of whether easy EMU liquidity conditions transferred to CEE and caused a credit boom that culminated in the current crises.
by "animal spirits" (Keynes), herding and self-fulfilling prophecies (see Akerlof and Shiller (2009), Shiller (2000) , De Grauwe (2008) and Minsky (1982) ).
Overinvestment in closed economies

The Mises-Hayek overinvestment theory
The overinvestment theories of Ludwig von Mises (1912) and Friedrich August von Hayek (1929 Hayek ( , 1934 explain overinvestment and crisis due to positive expectations and benign liquidity conditions in a closed (advanced) economy framework.
Assumptions and causes of the business cycle
Building upon Wicksell (1898) and Schumpeter (1912) , Mises and Hayek base their overinvestment theories on the distinction between three types of interest rates: First, the "internal interest rate", reflecting the expected return of investment projects. Second, the "natural interest rate", equivalent to an equilibrium interest rate which balances supply (saving) and demand (investment) on capital markets. Third, the "the money market rate"
which is set by the banking sector. In equilibrium, the natural rate of interest is equal to the money market rate. Then, the capital and the goods market are in equilibrium as well.
According to Mises and Hayek, boom-and-bust cycles along the long-term equilibrium path are initiated by buoyant credit expansions that lead to overinvestment. There are two reasons for excessive credit expansion:
(1) easy credit conditions (2) positive expectations (innovations) (Hayek 1976 (Hayek [1929 : 99).
In the first point, Mises and Hayek follow Wicksell (1898) , who introduces the idea of a money market rate fluctuating around an equilibrium interest rate (natural rate of interest), which is defined as the interest rate where savings match investment. As in Wicksell's (1898) framework, the banking sector has to hold market rates equal to the natural rate of interest to keep the economy in equilibrium. Whereas, if the banking sector holds market rates below the "natural rate", investors are able to get more credit as capital is relatively cheap. This induces an investment boom and causes wage growth that eventually leads to inflation.
In the second point, Mises and Hayek follow Schumpeter's concept of "new combinations"
(i.e. innovations) as a possible cause of positive expectations (Hayek, 1929; and Hayek, 1976: 95) . According to Schumpeter, an innovation is the result of competition, where "dynamic entrepreneurs" try to create an advantage over the other market participants to achieve higher
profits. An innovation can be the implementation of a new production process, a new product, access to new supply and demand markets or a new organisational structure (Schumpeter 1912: 100-103) . Other market participants soon realize the gains from this innovation and adopt it. Then profits shrink again and a new equilibrium at a higher level is achieved (Schumpeter 1928: 36) . As technological changes or access to new markets brings about higher returns (internal interest rates) and more output, they are not a reason for an unsustainable boom. But they can initiate irrational credit demand when expectations for future profits are over-optimistic due to imperfect information.
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The upswing
The boom may start, with a rise in capital demand due to positive expectations about future income (internal interest rate rises). Then the "natural rate of interest" increases as capital supply (which is equal to savings) remains constant. If banks provide credit at an unchanged money market rate, the money market rate falls below the "natural rate." Hayek and Mises argue that banks have the tendency to expand credit too far at unchanged rates, due to competition for the greatest market share (Mises 1912 : 409, 417, 420, 428, 430 und Hayek 1976 [1929 : 99). 6 This is often referred to as the "perverse elasticity of the banking sector."
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If a central bank increases interest rates following a rise in capital demand, this slows down the credit expansion as it restricts the liquidity conditions for banks. Therefore they increase the money market rate. But assuming the central bank keeps liquidity conditions unchanged in this situation 8 , commercial banks can keep the interest rates unchanged and directly transfer the loose liquidity conditions to the private sector (Hayek 1976 (Hayek [1929 5 This point was also stressed by Robert Shiller (2000) in "Irrational Exuberance" and recently by George Akerlof and Robert Shiller (2009) in "Animal Spirits". They argue that psychology, herding and irrational expectations lead to speculation, overinvestment and crisis. Similarly Minsky´s (1982) financial instability hypothesis argues that positive expectations drive the upswing. 6 Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) found that oligopolistic competition provides incentives to not adjust prices straight away and may provide a theoretical model for this behavior. 7 Also Minsky (1982) argues that the credit system exceeds credit lines too far. His finance scheme can be seen as a further explanation of the possible excesses during the boom. 8 This may be due to imperfect information or irrational expectations about future output. Furthermore Mises and Hayek often argue that central banks want to initiate an upswing via artificially lowering interest rates to enhance credit growth, investment and reduce unemployment during the recession. Under such conditions, lowering interest rates, although savings have not increased, can contribute to an artificial upswing that faces the same problem as a monetary policy mistake. Inflation will set in as preferences of households have not changed from consumption towards savings beforehand (see e.g. Mises 1928 ). Mises 1912: 417-430 (1884, 1923) , Hayek (1967 Hayek ( [1934 ) argues that money market rates which are below the natural rate change the investment structure in an economy. A lower money market rate implies that households and firms save a larger share (capital supply is high) and consume fewer of their income than they actually do. Therefore lower money market rates bring about relatively more "roundabout ways of production" and thus more capital goods than consumer goods. As the production becomes more capital intensive, the capital stock of an economy grows.
Increased investment in capital goods goes along with higher wages. As the amount of consumer goods does not increase and preferences of consumers do not change towards savings, higher wages lead to overconsumption and bring about rising consumer prices (Mises 1912, 430, 431) to close the inflationary gap that comes along with an investment overhang. Mises argues that this is equivalent to forced savings or wealth redistribution from workers (who intended to save a small amount of their income) towards investors (who save more) (Garrison 2004) . Therefore the boom is characterized by overinvestment and overconsumption (Garrison 2006: 72) .
The positive economic expectations can be transmitted to the asset markets where speculation may set in. This may be the case if households start buying stocks of the booming enterprises from the additional income to profit from the boom, instead of (forced) saving at lower interest rates. Then, consumer prices may not immediately increase. According to Schumpeter (1983 Schumpeter ( [1912 : 237) price expectations of stocks and other real assets can depart from the real economic development. A speculative mania may emerge, in which speculative price projections and "the symptoms of prosperity themselves finally become, in the well known manner, a factor of prosperity" (Schumpeter 1983 (Schumpeter [1912 : 226).
The turnaround and downswing
But when inflation accelerates and central banks start to increase interest rates, the turnaround is inevitable. Then, the banking sector does not renew credit lines and reassesses the risk (Hayek 1976 (Hayek [1929 : 101). The rising money market rate lifts the threshold for the profitability of all previous investment projects. Especially the production of capital goods is not profitable anymore. This dismantles investment projects with an internal interest rate below the risen money market rate. As the demand for capital declines during the recession, the natural interest rate falls.
Due to higher money market rates and negative expectations, investors start few new investment projects. On the other hand, more and more investment projects become unprofitable with general demand declining (negative multiplication effect). The capital stock of the economy shrinks. A recession follows which will be the deeper the larger the "exuberance" has been. Previous overconsumption turns into abstinence of consumption as the losses due to mal-investment have to be digested. The price level falls, especially in markets that have seen overinvestment and -consumption. In the last stage of the bust, when overinvestment has been dismantled and the misallocated production factors have been released, prospects for investors become better: First, the central bank can ease its liquidity conditions due to the falling inflation rate and capital demand and banks can provide credit more easily. Second, the demand for capital increases until the economy is in equilibrium again.
Implications
The structural adjustment after the turnaround is a necessary prerequisite for the recovery after the slump. According to Mises and Hayek the "crisis will heal the market" (Mises 1912: 431) as it separates profitable investment projects (with high internal interest rates) from investment projects with low profitability (low internal interest rates). In a crisis, market participants restore the disequilibrating effects of an expansionary credit policy to equilibrium. This implies the existence of an internal impulse towards equilibrium (Rizzo 1990 ).
Without such a cumbersome process, investment projects with low internal interest rate would be maintained, the necessary restructuring would be postponed, and the following upswing would not be sustainable. As further credit expansions during a crisis can delay the tendency to equilibrium, Mises and Hayek do not see them as useful tools against a crisis.
Therefore, the economic policy implication for central banks is to hold market rates close to the "natural rate of interest" and closely watch the liquidity conditions of the banking sector to safeguard the economy against volatility and severe crisis, because the longer market and natural rates differ, the bigger the catastrophe (Mises 1912, 436) .
However this does not solve the problem of the business cycle as a whole, because due to the "perverse elasticity of the banking sector", banks always tend to increase credit lines too far (capital supply) and thereby cause overinvestment. But holding interest rates close to equilibrium and supervising the banking sector smoothens the cycle (Hayek 1929) around the long-term growth path.
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Overinvestment in small open economies Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) 
Foreign credit and overinvestment
Foreign credit and growth
With closed capital markets, entrepreneurs can only raise money from domestic banks. In this context underdeveloped financial markets in emerging market economies are by definition characterized by high interest rates and risk (original sin) (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999) .
Therefore the expected return of planned investment projects has to be high to be realized.
According to overinvestment theories of Mises and Hayek the investment activity is sluggish in this scenario.
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Free access to international capital markets lowers money market rates and thereby accelerates investment and growth (McKinnon 1997 For instance in the 1990s, over-optimism about the future growth-path and false fiscal policy were incentives for neglecting the volatility risk and for rising credit demand in East Asia.
The availability of cheap U.S. and Asian monies allowed for exuberate credit growth and over-borrowing (Saxena and Wong 2002) . In the mean time, central banks implicitly guaranteed the banks to act as a lender of last resort in case of default and crisis. Therefore banks ignored risks of default because they believed that possible losses would be covered by an insurance system (Krugman 1998 , Corsetti et al. 1999 . Thus an artificially lowered risk premium further reduced the costs of capital for investors, and overinvestment emerged. Additionally, new unregulated financial products (derivatives) seemed to allow for unlimited credit creation at unchanged rates as banks could pass on the risks of investment via AAA rated derivatives to investors worldwide. Thus, the investment activity further increased and lifted the natural rate above the respective money market rate. This can be interpreted as signs of the "perverse elasticity of the banking sector." With central banks losing control over liquidity conditions, global excess liquidity after 2001 led to credit growth, inflation and real estate booms in several markets (Belke et al. 2008) . This contributed to hiking asset prices around the world (Borio 2008) , in particular in new and emerging markets as additional liquidity is likely to "vagabond" to the high-yielding markets (Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008) .
Overinvestment with respect to the exchange rate framework
The emergence of overinvestment cycles due to speculative capital inflows depends on the exchange rate regime of the small open economy. Under both, fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, overinvestment cycles can emerge, although causes and transmission differ.
Fixed exchange rates may attract speculative capital inflows as the exchange rate risk seems to diminish (Fischer 2001) . Without this risk foreign borrowing only depends on the interest rate differential with the anchor economy. Thus, capital flows to countries with fixed exchange rates should increase their exchange reserves as well as stock and real estate prices.
Overinvestment can emerge if banks borrow money denominated in foreign currency to give it to the domestic investors, without consideration of the exchange rate risk. According to Herzberg and Watson (2007) anchor economy experiences a cyclical downturn, the optimal money market rate (natural rate) in the small economy will be higher than in the anchor economy. This can fuel the boom in the small economy and bring about investment that only pays-off until interest rates in the anchor economy start to increase. But if business cycles are highly synchronized, as in the case of CEE and the euro area (Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2006) , this scenario is rather unlikely.
On the other hand, flexible exchange rates can attract speculative capital due to "one-way bets" on appreciation, especially in economies that are in the process of catching-up (McKinnon and Schnabl 2009b) . "One-way bets" on appreciation may also endanger price stability in volatile small open economies (Merza 2004) . Furthermore, if banks know that the domestic currency appreciates due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, they may borrow in the currency of the anchor economy and convert it into the domestic currency. When the domestic currency appreciates, the value of foreign liabilities declines (in terms of domestic currency). In this situation, the central bank faces the revaluation loss and allows for more speculative investment and consumption of the private sector (Schnabl 2008a) . Herding behavior can make appreciation expectations reinforcing and bring about a highly overvalued currency (Schnabl 2008a) . In periods of contraction this effect is well-known. During the Asian crisis 1997/98 investors expected a strong depreciation and withdrew capital.
As in both exchange rate strategies, volatility of the economy increases with the amount of capital attracted. Most emerging market economies intervene in the foreign exchange market and accumulate reserves to safeguard the economic stability, even though they announce the exchange rates to be flexible (Schnabl 2008a) . When reserves are accumulated, speculative capital inflows translate into additional monetary expansions. Thus, the money market rates fall below the natural rate. Following Hayek and Mises the monetary expansion eases credit conditions for the banking sector and translates into additional credit to the private sector, due to the competition among banks. The credit boom is characterized by falling interest rates and a rising number of low-yielding investment projects.
In both cases imports increase relative to export. On the one hand, exuberate capital inflows to economies that peg their currency to an advanced economy translate into higher wages and inflation (Schnabl and Ziegler 2008) , improving the purchasing power of consumers in the small open economy. On the other hand, under a flexible exchange rate regime, the purchasing power increases relatively as the domestic currency appreciates. Both transmission channels lead to an appreciation of real exchange rates (De Grauwe and Schnabl 2005) . As in the theory of Hayek and Mises, savings are unlikely to increase with declining interest rates. Therefore the wealth effect from overinvestment contributes to higher consumption and increases imports as they become relatively cheaper. Thus, in both cases, imports tend to increase relative to exports due to the capital inflows into the economy.
Overinvestment is followed by overconsumption.
Benign liquidity conditons and overinvestment cycles in CEE
In this section, an empirical analysis shall provide evidence of whether easy liquidity conditions in the EMU affected liquidity conditions in CEE as suggested in section 3.
Furthermore, it is elaborated, whether a credit-induced overinvestment boom possibly emerged due to a divergence of the money market from the natural rate that led to the current crisis in CEE (in the sense of the augmented Mises-Hayek theory).
Impact of easy EMU liquidity conditions on CEE
Foreign capital inflows and liquidity conditions in CEE
Opening capital markets brought about capital inflows to CEE due to two reasons: First, positive growth expectations attracted FDI as well as portfolio investment from international investors financed at the cost of low world interest rates. Second, as most banks in CEE are foreign owned, they were considered to be safe lenders. For instance in Estonia, Swedish banks dominate the banking sector. Similarly, Austrian banks play a significant role in
Hungary. This domination of western subsidiaries and foreign owned banks raised the credibility of the financial sector and allowed for an easy access to international capital (Ehrlich et al. 2002, Sepp and . Both, FDI and foreign owned banks seemed to provide an insurance against financial instability.
Foreign borrowing of banks increased in CEE, because the interest rate spread between the euro area and CEE was high (Figure 2 and 3) . This was especially the case after 2002 when world interest rates were abnormally low (Taylor 2008, Lombari and Sgherri 2007) and CEE improved its macroeconomic stability as a prerequisite for EU accession. Foreign borrowing brought about falling lending rates and a dependency on foreign credit. The banking sector passed on the currency risk from borrowing in euro to the private sector. The capital inflows squeezed the spread between deposit and lending rates in CEE close to the spread in the euro area ( Figure 4 ). This provided an incentive to take higher risks to both borrowers and lenders.
Although the exchange rate risk adds to the risk premium, the falling lending-loan rate spreads (that can be seen as measures of risk) reflect that investors neglected this risk as EU membership and guaranteed euro adoption seemed to make depreciations unlikely. The exclusion of the risk further lowered loan rates. Therefore, especially in countries with exchange rate pegs, interest rates converged towards the EMU level (Figure 2 
Transmission of benign liquidity conditions in the EMU to CEE
Granger causality tests can help with finding evidence of a transmission of benign liquidity conditions from the EMU to CEE (Granger 1969) . Following the augmented overinvestment framework, easy liquidity conditions are a deviation of the real money market rate from the natural rate. Therefore, the null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the deviation of the real money market rate from the natural rate in the EMU does not Granger Cause the deviation in the NMS. If the test rejects the null, this provides evidence of a transmission. The
Schwartz criterion is used to select the correct lag length for the Granger causality test.
For the analysis, monthly data is taken from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF provided by the Reuters EcoWin database. The data set starts in 1998 as before data is not completely available and the countries were in the transition from a socialist to a market economy. The data includes money market rates, consumer price inflation and industrial production for the NMS and the EMU, respectively. Industrial production replaces GDP because GDP aggregates are not available on monthly basis. Quarterly data would only allow a regression of 40 observations (10 years) and not provide a sufficient sample size.
Furthermore using quarterly data means a further aggregation and a loss of information. As industrial production is very sensitive to the business cycle and highly correlated with GDP, the data should be sufficient for the estimations.
The real money market rate is calculated by subtracting consumer price inflation from the money market rate for each economy. Most commonly, the natural rate of interest is seen as a long-term real growth trend of GDP (HP filter). This is a derivation from the Ramsey model where the equilibrium interest rate is equal to the rate of technological progress, and thereby equal to the rate of long-term growth. Therefore in this paper the natural rate is the trend of real growth (industrial production). 13 Thus, the deviation from the natural rate is equal to real growth trend minus the real interest rate. The HP filter with a lambda of 14400 is applied to calculate the trend using monthly data. The deviation from the trend is further labelled as (Table 1) . Therefore easy liquidity conditions from the EMU, as defined here, transferred to these CEE economies.
In contrast, the EMU gap does not Granger cause the gaps in Slovakia and Romania. This is surprising as both countries have had only partly flexible (RO, SK) exchange rate regimes.
Therefore it seems interesting whether EMU money market rates Granger cause money market rates at all. In Slovakia, the null of no Granger causality is only rejected if more lags (following the Akaike criterion) are included. However this is not the case for Romania, other factors (for instance the domestic banking sector) drive the money market rates in Romania.
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Possible signs of an overinvestment cycle
The credit boom?
Capital inflows and increased foreign borrowing of banks went along with high growth in output, credit growth and current account deficits in CEE, especially in the economies with exchange rate pegs. Figure 5 shows that in the CEE economies credit to the private sector as share of all assets has increased strongly after 2002. Further, the credit-deposit ratios of banks in 2007 are high above their past averages, especially in the Baltics, Romania and Bulgaria (Figure 6 ), which can be seen as a financial deepening indicator but also as a sign of more risk-taking by banks (Beck et al. 2000) . Similarly, credit to the private sector as percent of GDP increased especially in countries with pegs to the euro (Figure 7 ).
[ However, there is a broad consensus that credit booms are hard to spot before the event of the crisis, because high growth rates of output and credit to the private sector may also be justified by financial deepening (Beck et al. 2000) , new technology, institutional change (as explained by Hayek and Schumpeter) The share price index follows the Eichengreen-Mitchener scheme for a credit boom.
[ Figure 8 ] 16 Second, the development of the investment/GDP ratio is illustrated in Figure 9 using data of quarterly capital formation. Figure 12 indicates that there was no difference between the countries with flexible and fixed exchange rates. Although nominally the exchange rate was stable, for instance in Estonia, capital inflows led to wage and (asset) price increases, which appreciated the currency in real terms during the boom period.
[ Figure 
Did easy liquidity contribute to boom-and-bust cycles?
Thus far the paper has shown that easy EMU liquidity conditions transferred to CEE and provided signs of a possible overinvestment boom prior to the current bust. In this part the analysis follows Carilli and Dempster (2008) to test whether easy credit conditions caused the boom that endogenously led to a bust, using a polynomial distributed lag model. 21 They show that a deviation of the money market from the natural rate in the United States increases GDP growth only for some periods, but in the long-run it causes a bust.
20 See Appendix B. 21 A polynomial distributed lag model is chosen as the overinvestment theories suggest that the relationship between the deviation and growth is quadratic (Carilli and Dempster 2008) .
PDL-models are first introduced in Almon (1965) and most prominently used in Anderson and Jordan (1968) and Batton and Thornton (1983) . The advantage over estimating a VAR is that the model estimates only few coefficients although it includes many lags in the estimation and derives their coefficients in a second step. Thus, it allows for a calculation of the coefficients with many lags and relatively few observations.
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Applying this technique to CEE, the lags of the deviation of the money market rate from the natural rate in CEE should explain the movements of industrial production. Here, more recent innovations in the interest rate should have a positive impact on growth, while more distant movements have a negative impact. The data in use remains the same. Granger causality tests verified the direction of transmission from the interest rate gap to the growth rates for all CEE economies.
In Appendix B the results for each country are illustrated separately using 24 lags (two years)
in Tables 3 to 12 and significant. Thus, a deviation of the money market rate from the natural rate has a positive effect on growth after 3 to 4 months.
Further, the exchange rate regime does not play a role for inducing boom-and-bust cycles due to a deviation of the market and the natural rate. However, the explanatory power is the highest for countries with hard pegs such as Estonia, Bulgaria and Latvia. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the regression is relatively high for Poland and Hungary (see Appendix D). For different lag lengths also the explanatory power for Romania and Lithuania is high.
This signals that a deviation from the natural rate contributed to boom-and-bust-cycles in these countries.
Economic policy implications
This paper has focused on explaining how overinvestment due to easy liquidity conditions in Even though there is not a full insurance against speculation and false risk assessment, to lower the probability of economic turmoil in the future and cope with the current crisis the following policy implications arise from the paper:
First, as outlined by the overinvestment theory, the money market rate has to be close to its natural rate to reduce the risk of overinvestment cycles in the EMU and CEE, respectively. Jan-94 Jan-96 Jan-98 Jan-00 Jan-02 Jan-04 Jan-06 Jan-08
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Appendix C The PDL-model
The lag-model for the CEE economies is specified as follows: Real growth in industrial production ĝ is a function of the deviation of the natural from the real interest rate in CEE 
